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Gratitude: “The Quintessential Positive Psychology Trait”? 
 
Gratitude has undoubtedly been one of the “success stories” of positive psychology. It has 
been found to deliver successful outcomes in positive psychological interventions 
consistently and has been associated with a host of benefits, both individually and 
interpersonally. For instance, it has been found to play a role in increasing and maintaining 
subjective well-being, increased positive and decreased negative affect (Emmons & 
McCullough, 2003); satisfaction with life (Fagley, 2012; Froh, Yurkewicz, & Kashdan, 2009) 
and improved mental health (Froh, Emmons, Card, Bono, & Wilson, 2011). From a more 
collective point of view, gratitude promotes pro-social behaviour and strengthens social 
bonds (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; Bartlett & De Steno, 2006; Grant & Gino, 2010). It has 
demonstrated robust effects in positive psychological interventions in both clinical (Geraghty, 
Wood, & Hyland, 2010a, 2010b) and educational contexts (Seligman, Steen, Park, & 
Peterson, 2005; Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, & Linkins, 2009). In the light of these findings, it 
is perhaps not surprising that gratitude has been labelled “the quintessential positive 
psychology trait” (Wood, Joseph, Lloyd, & Atkins, 2009, p. 43). It abounds in benefits and 
makes a significant contribution to well-being and positive mood. 
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Without wishing to detract from the success of gratitude within positive psychology, 
there are good reasons to question whether gratitude is as straightforwardly positive as many 
have supposed.  For one thing, it should not be taken for granted that researchers in this field 
share a unitary view of what gratitude is. Indeed, gratitude might better be construed as an 
umbrella concept that subsumes a number of “sub-concepts” which share family 
resemblances with each other (Gulliford, Morgan, & Kristjánsson, 2013). 
We challenge gratitude’s virtually uncontested status as unqualifiedly “positive” in 
both conceptual discussion (Gulliford et al., 2013) and on the basis of empirical research 
(Morgan, Gulliford, & Kristjánsson, 2014). In the following sections, we describe different 
kinds of gratitude that might differ in terms of their valence, and we raise the possibility that 
people diverge in terms of conditions they place on when they believe gratitude to be 
appropriate. We shed light on whether lay people deem gratitude to be positive by sharing 
highlights from two empirical studies conducted by the Jubilee Centre for Character and 
Virtues’ Attitude for Gratitude project. 
Before discussing this research, we should consider what it means to describe 
gratitude—or hope, joy or awe—as “positive” traits, “positive” emotions or “positive” 
strengths of character. A common way in which “positive” is applied in positive 
psychology—and in emotion research generally (see Solomon & Stone, 2002)—rests on 
phenomenology: gratitude often feels good. Psychology has tended towards a hedonic view 
of well-being wherein “positive emotions” equate somewhat simplistically to “pleasant 
emotions”. On this basis, an emotion or trait can be described as “positive” simply because it 
feels good to experience it. There are some serious problems with this account, however. For 
instance compassion, understood as a fleeting emotion or a stable trait of character, feels 
painful but few would doubt its positive moral influence and motivating power. Conversely, 
people can feel pleasure at another person’s misfortune, which is hardly morally admirable. 
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Simply put, how we feel may be a misleading heuristic when it comes to appraising whether 
something is good (“positive”). 
To circumscribe emotions or enduring character traits like gratitude and hope as 
“positive” fails to take account of the contexts in which they are experienced. There are 
occasions when hope might be deemed positive or “adaptive” and times when it is dismissed 
as pathological and illusory wishful thinking. The idea that emotions or enduring character 
traits can be carved up into discrete and enduring categories labelled “positive” and 
“negative” is misguided because a great deal depends on the circumstances. Psychologists 
often label anger a “negative” emotion, yet clearly there is a place for righteous indignation in 
challenging injustice. At all events, it is far from clear that all people find the experience of 
anger unpleasant. Indeed, Aristotle proposed anger was in part unpleasant but also partly 
pleasant (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 113–116 [1378a30-b4]). 
Thus it would seem that the valence of an emotion or trait cannot be calibrated as 
either singularly positive or negative. Gratitude is more likely to be perceived as positive in 
circumstances where a valuable gift has been given thoughtfully and generously, for example, 
but it might take on a more negative resonance if we feel embarrassed by the gift and 
obligated to return the favour.  Some psychologists have attempted to uphold the exclusively 
positive valence of gratitude by deeming gratitude and indebtedness distinct positive and 
negative emotional states respectively (Watkins, Scheer, Ovnicek, & Kolts, 2006). However, 
as we indicate elsewhere (Morgan et al., 2014), correlations between gratitude and 
indebtedness (Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968; Watkins et al., 2006) tell against a clear 
distinction between the concepts.  Whilst Watkins et al. (2006) “demonstrated that gratitude 
can be dissociated from indebtedness, they do not discuss the issue of whether gratitude 
typically is dissociated from indebtedness (by the layperson)” (Morgan et al., 2014, p. 11), an 
issue to which we will return. 
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Positive psychologists have gone so far as to locate so-called “positive emotions” in 
an overarching theory, the “broaden-and-build” theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 
1998, 2001). The essence of this theory, which itself draws on Isen’s research on the effect of 
positive and negative affect on cognition (Isen, 1990; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, 
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen & Means, 1983), is that “positive” (pleasant) emotions 
such as joy, interest, pride, inspiration and awe, broaden thought-action repertoires (attention, 
working memory, openness to information) which in turn builds enduring personal resources, 
such as increased resilience and enhanced learning strategies. Gratitude, having been deemed 
a positive emotion, has been subsumed into this theory (Fredrickson, 2004). 
While this may please some psychologists researching gratitude, it reduces the 
contribution emotions make to human life to a simple polarity of positive or negative. This 
obscures the unique contributions particular emotions make in the complex circumstances of 
human interactions. It makes gratitude “good” (positive) on the basis of an instrumentalist 
agenda. Gratitude (like awe, joy, love, hope and pride) is then seen as good because it 
broadens thought-action repertoires to build enduring positive resources, rather than because 
they are intrinsically related to a life well-lived. The “broaden-and-build” theory, established 
on the basis of classifying emotions by valence, therefore further compounds the problems of 
labelling emotions as positive or negative. 
This diversion demonstrates that the label “positive” can mean different things. For 
the most part, “positive” is taken to mean pleasant, though it can also mean healthy or 
adaptive, conducive to happiness or flourishing, or favourable to well-being (however that is 
construed). For a thorough review see Solomon (2001, pp. 162–177). The main problem with 
this binary classification is that it fails to take account of the circumstances in which an 
emotion, or enduring trait, is expressed. Simply put: is gratitude always good? We shed light 
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on this question from a number of empirical angles. Before doing so, however, it is important 
to review the concept of gratitude itself. 
 
The Meaning of Gratitude: Key Conceptual Contours 
Spurred by a rising tide of interest in virtue ethics in general, a number of key philosophical 
papers about gratitude have emerged over the last forty years. Berger (1975), Simmons 
(1979), McConnell (1993), Roberts (2004, 2012), Nisters (2012) and Carr (2013) offered 
conceptual analyses of gratitude. Others have examined specific conceptual issues raised in 
the literature, such as whether gratitude must involve a benefactor (McAleer, 2012), whether 
it involves an intentionally rendered benefit (Fitzgerald, 1998) and whether it is necessarily 
supererogatory (Card, 1988; Roberts, 2004; Wellman, 1999).  A further debate, central to this 
paper, is whether gratitude is unambiguously positive in nature (Gulliford, 2016; Morgan et 
al., 2014; Morgan, Gulliford, & Carr, 2015). 
Our review of philosophical and psychological literature on gratitude revealed that 
these conceptual controversies were far from being resolved, and that much psychological 
research on gratitude proceeded without taking these important conceptual issues on board 
(Gulliford et al., 2013). There have been very few attempts to assess how conceptual 
differences in understanding gratitude might impact on reported gratitude, and whether these 
factors serve to modify its reported valence. 
In the vignette study which follows we present findings from a questionnaire in which 
we operationalised gratitude as an interpersonal construct involving a benefit, a beneficiary 
and a benefactor. Elsewhere we have characterised this as a ‘triadic’ conception of gratitude 
(Gulliford et al., 2013). In contrast, gratitude may also be construed in ‘dyadic’ terms 
(involving only a beneficiary and a benefit but with no specific benefactor implicated). 
Examples of this kind of gratitude include an appreciation of nature, or being grateful for 
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things one has in one’s life without reference to these benefits being provided by an agent. 
For the purposes of this chapter, we limit our discussion to findings related to the former 
‘triadic’ conception of gratitude, though we note the existence of both types of gratitude in 
our conceptual paper (Gulliford et al., 2013). 
To probe laypeople’s conceptual understanding of gratitude, we created a vignette 
questionnaire in which some of the conceptual controversies noted above were systematically 
manipulated. This enabled us to see whether the factors identified by philosophers and 
psychologists impacted on the gratitude participants reported. Psychologists Tesser et al. 
(1968) and Wood, Maltby, Stewart, Linley, & Joseph (2008) examined the role of cost, value 
and (perceived) benefactor intention, though they have not attempted to examine as many of 
the conceptual contours as we identified in our review. 
Each scenario began with a baseline question which was subsequently manipulated to 
examine different conceptual controversies. For instance, in one vignette the baseline 
condition was as follows: 
“A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive 
recognition of your hard work and a voucher.” (Baseline Condition) 
Participants then responded to three questions: whether they would be grateful if that scenario 
were to arise (measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 
5 = Strongly Agree); how grateful they would be (with degree registered on a scale of 0 “Not 
at all grateful” to 100 “Most grateful you could feel”) and whether they should be grateful 
(also measured on a 5-point Likert scale). The same three questions (counterbalancing the 
order of are grateful and should be grateful) were asked in each manipulation from the 
baseline. Examples of manipulations are shown below: 
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“A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive 
recognition of your hard work and a voucher. The colleague has nominated you 
because she wants you to repay the favour by helping her with her own workload.” 
(Ulterior Motive Condition) 
“A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive 
recognition of your hard work and a voucher. The colleague had to spend a long time 
filling in the nomination form outside of work.” (Cost (to the Benefactor) Condition) 
 “A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive 
recognition of your hard work and a voucher. You feel thankful that your colleague 
nominated you but you also feel uncomfortable now that you are indebted to her.” 
(Mixed Emotion Condition) 
We created a gratitude scenario surrounding the idea of being nominated for an award in 
order to examine conceptual controversies we had identified in our literature review: cost/risk 
to benefactor; ulterior and malicious motives (to examine whether gratitude necessarily 
involves an intentionally rendered benefit); intended benefits that miscarried/were unrealised; 
value of the benefit; and mixed emotions. The latter condition addressed the present question 
of whether gratitude was evaluated in unambiguously positive terms. By systematically 
manipulating the scenarios, we were able to distinguish what factors impacted on 
participants’ reported gratitude. 
A sample of 260 adults completed the questionnaire. 76.2% were female; ages ranged 
from 18–65 years (mean age 27.7 years); and 81.9% identified as White British. The same 
scenario was also completed by a sample of adolescents from a secondary school in Cheshire, 
UK. In this sample, 57.6% were female, with ages ranging from 11–17 years (mean 
age = 13.5 years). 94.2% were White British. 
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In line with theoretical arguments, our data from the combined adult and adolescent 
samples (N = 418) demonstrated how increased cost on behalf of the benefactor led to an 
increase in the amount of gratitude experienced; in comparison to the baseline condition the 
degree of gratitude significantly increased when benefactors were described as expending 
greater effort in bestowing the benefit (Mean Baseline degree = 68, Mean Cost degree = 77, 
p < .001). Interestingly, however, we found that gratitude does not depend conceptually on an 
intentionally rendered benefit; malicious and ulterior motives significantly reduced reported 
gratitude but did not disqualify it; 31.7% of respondents would feel grateful regardless of 
whether a benefactor had an ulterior motive of nominating them for an award with the motive 
of being helped with their workload, and 13.3% would nonetheless be grateful for nomination 
that was calculated to embarrass them. This clearly refutes the position that gratitude is 
necessarily seen to involve benevolent intentions. It should of course be borne in mind that 
benefactor intention may not always be transparent in lived experience. However, our 
findings show that people do not automatically rule out gratitude even when ulterior or 
malicious motives have been clearly portrayed. 
With regard specifically to the valence of gratitude, participants endorsed the view 
that mixed emotions (i.e. feeling grateful but also feeling indebted) impacts on experience of 
gratitude. The presence of such emotions yielded significant reported decrements in gratitude 
from baseline on all three measures (ARE, SHOULD and DEGREE) in the combined sample 
(see Table 1). The table also illustrates mean differences across the measures in the adult and 
adolescent samples. 
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 Mean ARE Scores 
(1–5) 
Mean SHOULD 
Scores 
(1–5) 
Mean DEGREE Scores 
(0–100) 
“Not entirely 
pleasant” 
Mean Agreement 
Scores (1–5) 
Baseline 
Condition 
Mixed 
Feelings 
Baseline 
Condition 
Mixed 
Feelings 
Baseline 
Condition 
Mixed 
Feelings 
Mixed Feelings 
Adolescent 
response 
4.01 3.54 4.24 3.74 64.04 56.27 2.88 
Adult 
response 
4.22 3.85 4.43 4.21 70.06 64.28 3.13 
Average 
response (all 
data) 
4.14 3.73 4.35 4.03 67.76 61.40 3.02 
Table 1. The mean ARE, SHOULD and DEGREE responses across the Baseline and “Mixed Feelings” 
conditions for both adults and adolescents. Note that the final column shows the mean responses to an 
additional question posed; “Gratitude is not an entirely pleasant emotion”. Participants registered their 
agreement with this statement from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, we asked participants an additional question regarding the positive 
valence of gratitude. Participants registered their agreement to the following statement: 
“Gratitude is not an entirely pleasant emotion”. The average response across all participants 
(on a Likert scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree) was 3.02, sitting on the 
neutral, midpoint mark. To further elucidate this issue, we asked participants to explain their 
answer to this question by means of the following prompt: ‘Please explain your answer to the 
last question about gratitude not being entirely pleasant here’. This question offered rich 
qualitative data which was subsequently coded thematically by two independent researchers. 
The two raters coded 60% of the adult data and 100% of the adolescent data and agreed on 
twenty-five thematic codes (see Figure 1, for the ten most referenced themes). The dataset 
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was subsequently recoded based on these twenty-five codes. The level of agreement in the 
two researchers’ coding was tested using Cohen’s Kappa (a test of inter-rater reliability) and 
findings revealed a 75% overlap between the two sets of codes. 
When exploring the codes that both researchers agreed on, ten themes were particularly 
prevalent. As can be seen in Figure 1 over 40% of adults and almost 30% of adolescents 
described feelings of indebtedness and obligation. Several of these respondents described 
how you can feel both grateful and indebted at the same time: 
 “You are grateful for the nomination but now you're indebted you feel 
beholden to the colleague. Therefore gratitude is bittersweet”. (Adult 
respondent) 
“Gratitude is pleasant at the time but does hold a sense of owing or 
debt”. (Adult) 
“Gratitude is a pleasant emotion because there are numerous parts that 
feel good […] however, when someone does something good for you, 
you feel a slight sense of owing them back—indebted, and like you have 
put them out of their way- like their action that you are grateful for has 
cost them something”. (Adult) 
“I feel that feeling grateful also makes you feel like you owe them 
something back and you could feel embarrassed”. (Adolescent) 
“It is a pleasant emotion as you know that the person is trying to help 
you; however, it also leaves you indebted to them”. (Adolescent) 
“It is nice to have someone say thank you, but the person who feels 
gratitude is in debt to the other person”. (Adolescent) 
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As mentioned earlier, Watkins et al. (2006) argued for the dissociation of gratitude and 
indebtedness on the basis that that they are related to different action tendencies. They found 
that gratitude tends to be associated with broad prosocial thought/action tendencies, and 
appears to inhibit antisocial tendencies, whereas action tendencies associated with 
indebtedness and obligation are more narrow and mixed (p. 234).  Our data here, however, 
suggest that laypeople often associate the two constructs; it is hard to argue that indebtedness 
does not co-occur alongside gratitude at least some of the time. Differentiating them at the 
conceptual level is certainly possible, but it seems illogical to ignore that gratitude can be 
linked to negative feelings, especially as our own findings suggest that the co-occurrence of 
gratitude and indebtedness leads to a decrease in the degree of gratitude experienced (see 
Table 1).1 
 
Other negative emotions described in this data set include guilt and awkwardness, 
embarrassment or being uncomfortable: 
“Sometimes it can be felt with guilt, or pressure as there is an 
expectation to return the favour—thus souring the nice feeling of 
someone doing something for you”. (Adult respondent) 
“Gratitude is a pleasant emotion but is often paired with uncomfortable 
feelings such as guilt”. (Adult) 
                                                          
1 Participants had previously responded to the ‘mixed emotion’ item (See p. 6) which 
explicitly referenced ‘indebtedness’. While this could have influenced people’s responses, it 
should be noted that not all respondents referenced indebtedness in response to the open-
ended question. Given the co-occurrence of gratitude and indebtedness generally, it is not 
surprising that participants returned to this issue in the qualitative question. It seems as 
though participants could easily relate to the mixed-emotion scenario. 
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“It can be embarrassing to feel in someone's debt or to feel their praise. 
Sometimes praise is uncomfortable—attention on you etc.” (Adult) 
“Can be awkward to deal with for either/both parties”. (Adult) 
“I agree because in many situations, you are made to feel 
uncomfortable about it as you feel that you have to repay them”. 
(Adolescent) 
“Because when you are grateful you also feel guilty because you 
always feel like you will owe them something in return”. (Adolescent) 
“Because you feel like you owe something back and if it is for the 
wrong reason it can make you feel very uncomfortable or on edge”. 
(Adolescent) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the percentage of respondents referring to these themes is larger in 
the adult population than the adolescent (Awkward/Embarrassed/Uncomfortable: 18% adult, 
11% adolescent; Guilt: 12% adult, 4% adolescent). Relatedly, adolescents were more likely 
than adults to base their reasoning around the intentions of the benefactor and specifically 
refer to the existence of non-benevolent motives. This may suggest a different perception of 
gratitude across the lifespan, or at least an emphasis or concentration on different elements of 
gratitude experience; further research would shed more light on this issue. 
Whilst the percentage of respondents referring to the intentions of the benefactor and 
highlighting awareness of non-benevolent motives could be higher than is recorded here (i.e., 
15% and 18% of adolescent respondents, respectively), it is important to recognise such 
themes appear in the dataset. We have argued extensively elsewhere (Morgan et al., 2015) 
that gratitude should not simply be promoted as feeling grateful for everything that is 
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bestowed upon you; rather, gratitude should be calibrated depending on the situation, and the 
beneficiary should keep in mind important factors such as benefactor intention, cost to the 
benefactor, and value of the benefit (see also Wood et al., 2008). In other words, we take a 
broadly Aristotelian view of gratitude (even though gratitude itself may not have been viewed 
as a virtue by Aristotle), namely that gratitude, for the flourishing life, should be expressed 
towards the right person, for the right reasons and at the right time (see Morgan & Gulliford, 
2015). 
Interestingly, a proportion of the respondents described how evaluating gratitude 
experience in line with considerations of intention, cost and value could lead to situations 
where gratitude is due, but had to be forced or compelled: 
“I think sometimes there's a false gratitude; when you feel like you 
should be grateful, so pretend to yourself that you are”. (Adult 
respondent) 
 “Sometimes you may feel an emotion that you don't want to feel, you 
may feel grateful for something or to someone even though you don't 
want to”. (Adult) 
“I guess you could feel like you have to be grateful even though it's 
something that you didn't necessarily want”. (Adult) 
“Sometimes you feel like you should be grateful in the situation that you 
are in, but sometimes don't feel like you can be”. (Adult) 
“Because sometimes you might not want to be grateful in the situation 
but have to be”. (Adolescent) 
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It could be argued that forced (or insincere) gratitude such as this is not really gratitude at all. 
Taking the broadly Aristotelian view that virtues are characterised by a certain “set” of 
attention, appropriate accompanying emotion, desire, behaviour and style of expression, a 
case of insincere gratitude might encompass only a behavioural element (a forced thank you) 
and certainly would not be constituted by all the elements described. It is interesting to note, 
however, that almost all the above quotations reference a lack of apposite emotion or desire. 
It is also important to point out that some respondents demonstrated a clear 
conception of gratitude as an entirely positive emotion. Some of these respondents rebuffed 
the idea that indebtedness or obligation would be experienced, whilst others described 
gratitude as being separate from negative emotions. Watkins et al. (2006) would clearly be 
pleased with this subset of respondents who offer support to their claim that gratitude can be 
dissociated from indebtedness: 
 “Gratitude is wholly pleasant, we should thank as much and often as 
possible. I don't agree that one would feel “indebted” to another for 
doing a good or nice thing, that is completely down to differences in 
character and personality”. (Adult respondent) 
“Can't see why it isn't pleasant.  There's a difference between gratitude 
and indebtedness”. (Adult) 
“Because I think you only feel gratitude when you are thankful for 
something and if the emotion wasn’t pleasant then you aren’t being 
thankful”. (Adolescent respondent) 
“I believe gratitude is a pleasant feeling. The feeling of gratitude comes 
when someone does something for you, so I believe it can only bring 
positive feelings”. (Adolescent) 
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Figure 1. The ten most referenced themes that came out when examining the qualitative explanations of whether 
gratitude is, or is not, entirely pleasant. 
 
What should be clear from the qualitative examples above is that there are multiple ways in 
which gratitude can be conceived. Our theoretical and empirical research has revealed that 
there are clear individual differences in people’s concepts of gratitude and that, to date, 
measures of gratitude have failed to differentiate between these conceptual understandings, 
presuming rather that participants share the same conception as the researchers themselves. 
Our research suggests that some people take a more “permissive” view of gratitude, 
where gratitude can be experienced when ulterior or malicious motives are involved, while 
others hold a more “restrictive” view, reporting that they would not be grateful in such 
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circumstances. Importantly, the kind of concept people have (permissive or restrictive) has an 
effect on the amount of gratitude people report. 
Using a novel measurement strategy, the Multi-Component Gratitude Measure 
(MCGM; Morgan, Gulliford, & Kristjánsson, 2016) gauges respondents’ conceptual 
understandings of gratitude alongside measuring grateful emotions, attitudes towards 
gratitude, and grateful behaviours. By including a conceptual component to our measure, we 
were able to highlight how conceptualisations of a construct constitute essential information 
and that this information can feed into measurement of the construct; in this case we focused 
on gratitude but the same approach could be extended to other constructs. 
Our findings from testing the MCGM demonstrate how appraisals of conceptions, 
emotions, attitudes and behaviours pertaining to gratitude are all necessary in order to 
comprehensively measure gratitude. Moreover, we illustrate that each component contributes 
towards well-being, as measured by three separate well-being scales: Satisfaction with Life 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), Subjective Happiness (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 
1999), and Positive Affect (as gauged by the PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
That is, on all three well-being scales, individuals who have suitably permissive views on 
when gratitude is experienced (a “high conception score”) alongside high scores on the 
emotion, attitude and behaviour components of the MCGM experience the highest levels of 
well-being. The relationship between the number of components that individuals are “high” 
on and well-being proceeds in an almost perfect linear pattern whereby being “high” on three 
components is associated with significantly less well-being than four components; two 
components reduces well-being further; and one or no components is associated with the 
lowest levels of well-being. 
Overall these findings illustrate how introducing a conceptual component can offer a 
clear profile of participants’ experience and understanding of gratitude and that this, in turn, 
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should be borne in mind in assessments of gratitude. Importantly, there is a clear relationship 
between conceptual understandings of gratitude and individuals’ grateful emotions, attitudes 
and behaviours; our results demonstrate how a more permissive understanding of gratitude 
(as indicated by higher conceptual ARE and DEGREE scores, see Table 1) give way to 
higher scores on the other three components of the MCGM as well as higher scores on 
existing gratitude measures: the GQ6 (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002); GRAT 
(Watkins, Woodward, Stone, T., & Kolts, 2003); and the Appreciation Scale (Adler & 
Fagley, 2005). 
 
Positive and Negative Features of Gratitude: A Prototype Analysis 
The characterisation of gratitude as unequivocally positive was also challenged by a 
prototype study of gratitude in the UK (Morgan et al., 2014). While prototype analysis does 
not offer a thorough conceptual analysis—it does not distinguish between features that are 
intrinsic to a concept and features that are often merely associated with that concept—it does 
enable researchers to categorise features that laypeople identify as central or peripheral to a 
given concept and can serve as an illuminating point of departure in assessing whether that 
concept is thought of in largely positive terms. 
In the first stage of a prototype analysis participants generate features of the concept 
of interest, which they rate in terms of valence. This elucidates whether a given concept is 
perceived to be generally positive, negative, neutral or mixed. The method has been used to 
examine concepts such as emotion (Fehr & Russell, 1984), love (Fehr & Russell, 1991), 
forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 2004), modesty (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 
2008) and nostalgia (Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). 
In the first of three studies, 108 student participants from the University of 
Birmingham, UK, listed features and characteristics of gratitude (feelings, actions, 
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consequences and determinants) which they rated for valance on a 5-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 = very negative to 5 = very positive. This yielded 63 key features of gratitude 
with a mean valance of 4.29 (SD = 0.70).2 While this figure suggests gratitude is generally 
perceived as positive (given that a score of 3 would be the theoretically neutral midpoint), a 
number of features of gratitude identified by the sample were  assigned a negative valence, 
such as “guilt” (which yielded a mean valence of 1.71) and “embarrassment/awkwardness” 
(2.11). Interestingly, these features were not named in a previous prototype analysis of 
gratitude in the USA, which produced fewer negative features overall than in UK (Lambert, 
Graham, & Fincham, 2009). Furthermore, in the UK, the features of “obligation” and 
“indebtedness” which were collapsed into a single category yielded a valence score on the 
negative side (2.26), whereas these features were accorded a neutral valence (of 3) in the US 
study. 
In a second study, 97 students from the University of Birmingham rated the centrality 
of the 63 features named by their colleagues in Study 1. The Likert rating scale ranged from 
1 = not at all central, to 8 = extremely central. Features that emerged as more central in Study 
2 tended to be rated more positively in valence in Study 1. However, the correlation between 
centrality and positive valence was not as strong in the UK as in the earlier US study, lending 
further weight to the suggestion that there may be cross-cultural differences in the perceived 
valence of gratitude.3 It should be borne in mind that both the British and American studies 
                                                          
2 Altogether 896 features were generated (M = 7.7 features per participant). These were 
coded into 201 features by two independent coders. The degree of overlap between the coders 
was very good (Cohen’s Kappa = .87). Features that were named only once or twice 
(N = 138) were discarded, leaving 63 key features. 
3 In the UK study r = .59, p < .001, where in the US study r = .84, p < .001. More recently, 
we have replicated this prototype analysis in Australia where the prevalence of negative 
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used small student samples in order to make controlled comparisons. Further studies, 
extending the method to different populations would be necessary to see whether these 
findings can be generalised to non-student populations. It would also be interesting to see this 
kind of work repeated in progressively more distant cultures (e.g. non-English speaking, non-
Western) to explore these differences further. 
It is interesting to note that the negatively-valenced features of “obligation”, 
“indebtedness”, “guilt”, “embarrassment” and “awkwardness” that emerged in our UK 
prototype analysis also figured prominently in the themes from the qualitative question that 
probed participants’ responses to their Likert assessment of whether gratitude is an entirely 
pleasant emotion (see Figure 1, above). Indebtedness or obligation was the top category for 
both adults and adolescents, while feelings of discomfort, embarrassment, awkwardness and 
guilt also featured in both adult and adolescent descriptions. 
As noted, prototype analyses do not distinguish between features that are intrinsic to a 
concept and features that are often merely associated with that concept. However, the overlap 
between the negatively-valenced features named in the prototype analysis and the themes that 
emerged in the open-ended question supports the view that these elements are regarded by 
many UK respondents as inherently characteristic of gratitude. This being so, positive 
psychological interventions that promote gratitude, particularly in educational settings, 
should not take gratitude to be an unalloyed positive concept and should explore complexities 
attending the question of when gratitude might not be deemed positive. With this in mind, we 
turn to existing positive interventions involving gratitude and raise the question of whether 
these might better be combined with the educational task of promoting “virtue literacy”: an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
features is closer to that found in the UK population than the US; the equivalent correlation 
between centrality and valence was .62 (p < .001). 
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understanding of what gratitude is, why it might be a desirable quality to cultivate and when it 
is appropriate. 
 
Gratitude in Positive Interventions: Gratitude and Virtue Literacy 
As previously noted, gratitude has been a positive psychological success story.  Interventions 
incorporating gratitude have demonstrated reliable and desirable (read “positive”) effects. 
Seligman et al. (2005) reported that the “Gratitude Visit” is one of the most robust 
interventions used in positive education. In this exercise, individuals express appreciation by 
writing a thank-you letter to someone whom they have never properly thanked. They make 
arrangements to visit this person and surprise them by reading out and delivering the letter in 
person. 
While the purpose of writing a thank-you letter is usually to make the recipient feel 
appreciated, Seligman et al. (2005) reported that reading out such a letter on a “gratitude 
visit” gives a boost of happiness to the person who is saying thank you, which endures for up 
to a month. They reported that people in a gratitude visit condition were significantly happier 
and less depressed after a month than were individuals in a control condition (people who 
wrote about their early memories in the week of the intervention). Although the effect of the 
intervention washed out over subsequent weeks (differences between the groups on both 
depression and happiness were no longer significant at three-month and six-month follow-
up), the fact that one such letter had an effect on both positive and negative affect that lasts 
even that long is striking, and has boosted gratitude’s status as a “positive” character strength. 
Another method puts into practice the age-old wisdom of “counting one’s blessings”. 
Emmons & McCullough (2003) were first to show that keeping a gratitude diary for just two 
weeks significantly improves subjective well-being. They also found that journal-keepers 
enjoyed better sleep, experienced fewer symptoms of physical illness and exercised more 
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than controls. Furthermore, participants with neuromuscular diseases reported less pain in the 
experimental (journal-keeping) group than in control groups.4 These findings have been 
replicated in clinical samples (Geraghty et al., 2010a, 2010b). Keeping a gratitude journal for 
two weeks significantly reduced worrying in clinically diagnosed depressed people as much 
as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), while the second study showed that journal-keeping 
for a fortnight significantly reduced body dissatisfaction in people with a diagnosis of an 
eating disorder. Such studies provide further evidence of gratitude’s “positive” valence on the 
reading of “positive” as healthy, adaptive or conducive to well-being (see above). 
A third type of intervention involves “gratitude reframing”. Essentially, the method 
aims at encouraging people to think more gratefully by moderating appraisals of benefit 
exchanges. Froh et al. (2014) reported that children aged 8–11 years can be taught to modify 
social-cognitive appraisals to strengthen “grateful thinking”, resulting in increased well-
being, positive affect and gratitude. Behaviourally, they also found children in the 
experimental condition wrote 80% more thank-you cards to their parent-teacher association 
than controls. 
While encouraging children to reflect on the personal value of a benefit, the 
benefactor’s intentions and the cost to render the benefit (factors we operationalised in the 
vignette questionnaire) may increase gratitude and “tune individuals into seeing the best in 
                                                          
4 There were three groups in Study 1: A gratitude condition, a group writing about daily 
hassles and a third group who wrote about life events (to obtain a neutral control condition). 
In Study 2 there were three groups: a gratitude group, a second group writing about daily 
hassles and a downward social comparison group. In Study 3 there was a gratitude group and 
a control group which completed self-report questionnaires without any other accompanying 
activity. Study 2 (in which the causal relationship with SWB was found) could be criticised 
for having an inadequate, non-neutral control group. 
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other people” (Froh & Bono, 2014, p. 194), we are concerned that this method, if applied 
uncritically, could bias people towards only seeing the good in others. Consequently, we 
suggest any interventions of this sort take place against the backdrop of educating children on 
the nature of gratitude and when it might—or might not—be appropriate (Carr, Morgan, & 
Gulliford, 2015; Morgan et al., 2015). 
Again, without wishing to detract from the much-vaunted success of gratitude 
interventions in positive psychology and in positive educational settings, there needs to be 
space for such interventions to be “virtue-educational”; to teach participants to reflect on the 
nature of gratitude and consider when it is appropriate. There is a potential “shadow side” of 
gratitude. We need to alert young people to the possibility that not all occasions where 
gratitude might seem warranted at first blush stand up to greater scrutiny. 
In line with our beliefs that gratitude should be explored in relation to contextual 
information and that researchers should not assume what laypeople perceive gratitude to be, 
we created a teaching resource that offered the opportunity for reflection on the construct. 
This primary school resource (for students aged 8–11 years) consisted of four gratitude 
stories; each story introduced various scenarios in which gratitude may, or may not, be 
experienced depending on the individuals’ conception of gratitude. 
For example, the story we called “St Oscar’s Oscars” followed a similar storyline to 
the above-mentioned questionnaire where colleagues were nominated for an award at work; 
in this case, students nominated their peers for the St Oscar’s Oscars where the award winner 
would receive family vouchers for the cinema. During this story the reader encountered 
situations where students bestow a great deal of effort when nominating their peer (by 
spending a long time on the “special certificate of nomination”); ulterior motives where one 
student nominates another in order to copy their spelling test; and themes of indebtedness 
with the characters feeling obliged to repay students whose nomination they had received. At 
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various junctures in the stories the participants were asked to stop to reflect on what they had 
read and answer questions about how they thought the characters would feel in that situation. 
The questions included open-ended and closed form responses such as Yes/No choices or 
Likert scale items to gauge the degree of gratitude experienced. 
When exploring the results from “St Oscar’s Oscars”, we discovered that 29% of the 
62 respondents reported that the character who had received a nomination under the guise of 
an ulterior motive (to copy his spelling test) would still be grateful for the nomination. 
Importantly, in this case, we explored the qualitative data surrounding this question to gauge 
whether students were explicitly aware of the presence of an ulterior motive; 70% of 
respondents understood that an ulterior motive was at play. In those cases where the ulterior 
motive was clearly recognised, only 7% of students indicated that they would be grateful for 
the nomination. 
The theme of indebtedness and obligation (as mentioned above) allowed us to 
examine whether mixed emotions (positive and negative) would impact on gratitude 
experience. In this example, Ethan feels obliged to nominate his classmate, Jordan, for an 
award because Jordan has nominated him. However, Ethan really wants to nominate 
somebody else, namely Dominic. After reading this section of the story, 63% of participants 
believed that Ethan should nominate Dominic; however, 21% suggested he now nominate 
Jordan instead. Additionally, students were asked “Do you think Ethan is grateful for the 
nomination he received from Jordan?”; 60% of respondents said “Yes” in response to this 
question, but 37% said “No” (3% even amended the response options to say “Yes and No”). 
An open-ended question asked them to explain this decision. These qualitative data 
highlighted themes that were also apparent in the adult and adolescent data, such as notions 
of awkwardness/being uncomfortable (12.9%); guilt (3.23%); mixed feelings (3.23%); being 
worried (6.45%); and feeling confused or unsure (40.32%): 
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“He will feel guilty to the person he didn’t vote for”. 
 “Ethan is feeling awkward. He doesn’t know who to choose”. 
“Worried in case if he votes for Dominic and Jordan is annoyed”. 
“He is in a very awkward position so he is probably feeling confused 
and stressed”. 
Findings from the stories lend further support to the view that gratitude is perceived to be of 
mixed valence, even for young people. All our empirical studies (the prototype analysis, 
vignette questionnaire, and gratitude stories) show that far from being an entirely positive 
concept, gratitude possesses elements that are experienced and rated negatively by laypeople. 
Furthermore, the meaning and associated valence of gratitude should not be taken for granted 
since multiple elements contribute to an individual’s understanding of gratitude (Gulliford & 
Morgan, 2016), resulting in an overall conception of gratitude that we have described as either 
“permissive” or “restrictive” (Morgan et al., 2016). In the former case gratitude can be 
experienced even when ulterior or malicious motives are implicated, while the latter 
designation describes a more “restrictive” view, where people report they would not be 
grateful in such circumstances. The kind of concept people have (permissive or restrictive) 
calibrates the amount of gratitude individuals report and highlights that the perceived valence 
of gratitude varies from person to person, related to their appraisals of factors that influence 
their understanding of gratitude. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Positive psychologists have largely taken the meaning and (positive) valence of gratitude for 
granted. Current interventions have tended to overlook the conceptual complexities 
surrounding gratitude, not least the question of whether it is an unambiguously positive 
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concept. Across a range of studies, we have shown that the UK public construes gratitude as a 
complex concept of mixed valence. 
Our prototype analysis of gratitude showed that members of the UK public named 
obligation, indebtedness, embarrassment, awkwardness and guilt as features of gratitude, to 
which they assigned a negative valence. The vignette questionnaire corroborated these 
findings; in an open-ended question probing participants’ responses to the question of 
whether gratitude is an entirely pleasant emotion, adults and  adolescents spontaneously 
described feelings of indebtedness, obligation, awkwardness, embarrassment, and guilt. This 
represents a striking degree of overlap with the prototype analysis and reflects themes we also 
found in children’s responses to the gratitude stories, where young people clearly wrestled 
with mixed emotions with regard to gratitude. 
While the vignette study presents findings from an interpersonal scenario (being 
nominated for an award by a work colleague), we are mindful that this ‘triadic’ model 
(benefactor, benefit and beneficiary) represents one understanding of gratitude. Further 
empirical research could fruitfully be conducted to shed light on factors that influence other 
species of gratitude. 
Complexities surrounding the concept of gratitude have been largely ignored in current 
gratitude interventions involving both adults and young people—a shortcoming we believe 
should be rectified. To this end, we suggest the widespread advocacy of gratitude in positive 
psychology be interpreted against findings which show that gratitude is not unambiguously 
positive. Alongside this recommendation, we believe that gratitude interventions should 
incorporate the educational task of promoting “virtue literacy” regarding gratitude as a 
potential virtue; an understanding of what gratitude is, why it might be a desirable quality to 
cultivate and when it is appropriate (Carr et al., 2015; Morgan et al., 2015) Finally and 
importantly, our research reveals that there are different species of gratitude that differ in 
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terms of their valence, and that people diverge in terms of the conditions they place on when 
they believe gratitude to be appropriate and indeed whether it is deemed positive. 
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